Why Space Matters – Infrastructure Without Borders
Space has become a strategic asset in a changing geopolitical landscape. Sovereign access to space, resilient satellite infrastructure, and leadership in critical technologies are indispensable for preserving Europe’s autonomy, economic resilience, and security (Letta, 2024).
Space systems not only support defence and civil protection, but also act as enablers of digital infrastructure, financial networks, and energy grids. Their disruption—whether from collision, cyberattack, solar storms, or hostile interference—can lead to cascading systemic risks. The growing interdependence between space-based and terrestrial systems renders orbital sustainability a matter of shared strategic concern.
The Growing Problem: Crowded, Risky, and Undergoverned
The increase in orbital traffic heightens the likelihood of conjunctions—close approaches between space objects—which can lead to collision if not mitigated.
The space debris population continues to grow. As of early 2025, over 42,000 debris objects larger than 10 cm were being tracked, with hundreds of thousands of smaller fragments remaining undetectable but dangerous (ESA, 2025b). A single collision at orbital velocity can generate thousands of high-speed fragments, each capable of disabling satellites.
These hazards impose operational burdens on satellite operators. Avoidance manoeuvres consume limited fuel, reducing satellite lifespan and disrupting service continuity. Operators must process hundreds of daily conjunction alerts. The lack of standardised protocols for communication and collision avoidance adds friction, especially between military and commercial or cross-border stakeholders (RAND, 2022).
Other emerging risks include increased radiofrequency interference, heightened spectrum competition, and growing insurance costs. The escalating complexity of orbital operations is not matched by robust regulatory oversight, leaving space actors vulnerable to cascading technical and legal risks.
In this context, two capabilities are becoming indispensable: Space Domain Awareness (SDA)—the capacity to detect, track, and predict the behaviour of space objects—and Space Traffic Management (STM), the system of rules and procedures for preventing collisions and managing shared orbital resources.
However, both SDA and STM remain highly fragmented. Most capabilities are held by national security agencies or commercial firms, with voluntary or incomplete participation in data-sharing initiatives.
How Is Space Governed Today? A Legal Primer
The cornerstone of international space law is the 1967 Outer Space Treaty (OST). The OST is supported by four additional treaties: the Rescue Agreement (1968), the Liability Convention (1972), the Registration Convention (1975), and the Moon Agreement (1979).
Crucially, these treaties provide no detailed guidance on operational safety—such as collision avoidance or data sharing. National licensing regimes vary significantly, and although UNCOPUOS (the UN Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space) facilitates dialogue, its outputs are consensus-based and non-binding (IRGC, 2021b).
In the absence of binding regulation, the global community has relied on “soft law”: voluntary commitments, best practices, and technical standards (RAND, 2022; IRGC, 2021b).
The result is a profound implementation gap: high-level principles exist, but effective, enforceable "rules of the orbital road" do not. Developing binding, interoperable STM norms is one of the most urgent regulatory challenges of the century.
The Case for Federated Governance in Space
Given the diversity of actors, the proliferation of space activities, and persistent geopolitical tensions, a centralised global authority for Space Traffic Management, which some actors wish to see implemented, is unlikely to materialise in the foreseeable future. National interests, sovereignty concerns, and competitive commercial dynamics render a unitary governance solution politically infeasible.
An STM system inspired by ICAO and IMO would require a rule-making body, decentralised implementation, transparent audit procedures, and flexible norms capable of evolving with technology. These features would significantly improve the predictability and safety of orbital operations.
A federated governance model offers a more pragmatic and scalable path forward—one that preserves autonomy while enabling coordinated and interoperable orbital operations – and one that allows for a strong commercial ecosystem to develop which is the stated goal of major players worldwide including the EU.
In such a model, Space Domain Awareness (SDA) capabilities are developed and maintained in modular regional or functional nodes. These nodes could be geographically based, alliance-oriented, or domain-specific (e.g., commercial vs. defence-oriented SDA). Each node would monitor, analyse, and share orbital data within its remit while adhering to internationally agreed standards.
The federated approach relies on common technical protocols and behavioural templates, allowing mutual recognition across jurisdictions. For example, actors would commit to certified manoeuvring rules, transparency protocols, and response timelines for collision avoidance. These templates could be machine-readable and embedded in spacecraft—akin to aircraft transponders and maritime AIS beacons. Such machine-readable behavioural norms could include standardised conjunction avoidance thresholds and response windows; pre-approved manoeuvre profiles and avoidance hierarchies; notification procedures before initiating evasive actions; and embedded consent flags for passive satellites or debris. These frameworks would allow both human and autonomous systems to anticipate behaviour, negotiate manoeuvres, and signal intent—reducing uncertainty and improving safety in densely populated orbital regions.
To facilitate coordination and trust across this distributed system, the model would include tiered data-sharing mechanisms. These tiers reflect the sensitivity of information and the trust level between actors.
Enforcement within a federated model would rest with national or regional authorities. These actors would integrate STM compliance into domestic licensing frameworks, conditioning launch approvals, orbital slot allocations, and spectrum access on demonstrable adherence to international behavioural norms. Insurance providers and institutional funders, as well as instruments such as “orbital safety ratings” (such as the SSR developed at EPFL in Switzerland in collaboration with ESA) could also incentivise compliance through premium differentiation or eligibility criteria.
This federated approach can also enable incremental adoption and institutionalisation. New norms and protocols can be trialled in “STM testbeds” or regulatory sandboxes. The results would inform broader adoption and, over time, form the basis for soft law, regional agreements, or eventual codification under the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (UNCOPUOS).
This model allows space governance to evolve iteratively, balancing innovation and sovereignty, flexibility and safety. It draws directly on federated models in aviation, maritime navigation, and internet governance, adapting them to the unique exigencies of orbital operations.
Such an approach offers a politically viable, operationally robust, and technologically adaptive solution for managing the shared and congested orbital environment today.
Division of Roles: Public and Private Actors Working Together
The governance of space traffic cannot rest on the shoulders of either governments or industry alone. Instead, a well-calibrated division of responsibilities between public and private actors is required—one that reflects the technological maturity and economic dynamism of today’s space sector. The European Union Space Surveillance and Tracking (EUSST) framework offers a timely case in point.
EUSST was originally conceived in the early 2010s, a period when commercial actors lacked the technological capability and operational readiness to provide end-to-end Space Situational Awareness (SSA) or Space Traffic Management (STM) services. At that time, it was logical for a public consortium to fill the vacuum by coordinating surveillance assets and distributing collision risk alerts. However, the sector has evolved rapidly. Today, several commercial companies offer advanced conjunction analysis, manoeuvre prediction, and automated traffic coordination—often with proprietary algorithms and value-added analytics integrated into operator systems.
Because of this shift, the EC’s operational model should evolve its original paradigm to avoid subsidising end-user services whereby public institutions may inadvertently undermine market signals and disincentivise commercial investment in safety-enhancing technologies.
To accelerate the development of the market, the EC and EUSST should transition away from its original path of strengthening public sector offerings and further developing tailored SSA services integrated into operator system at no cost, which—while well-intentioned—risks crowding out private innovation.
A more effective approach would be to reorient public-sector efforts toward foundational infrastructure: the provision of verified, high-quality orbital data and baseline services such as Conjunction Data Messages (CDMs). This would mirror the evolution of weather services and navigation systems, where governments maintain authoritative core datasets, while private companies deliver tailored, competitive applications on top.
Within the federated governance framework proposed in this chapter, EUSST would adopt a more structural, essential, and vital role. Rather than serving end-users directly, it would assume responsibility for the certification of machine-readable behavioural templates, including those related to conjunction avoidance protocols, manoeuvre transparency, and operator intent signalling. Through this the EUSST would position itself as a trusted validator within the ecosystem.
Such a transition would preserve EUSST’s public mission—safeguarding the shared orbital commons—while also catalysing a more dynamic and scalable commercial STM market. It would allow national agencies and private operators to specialise in what they do best: governments in maintaining secure, open-access data architectures; industry in building innovative, user-focused tools for safe and sustainable space operations.
The recently shared EU Space Act would be an incredible instrument to make this reality happen!
Innovation in space isn’t only about rocket engines, sensors, or AI—it must also encompass legal innovation. Just as agile development cycles in software benefit from continuous testing and rapid iteration, legal sandboxes allow laws and regulations to be trialled, stress-tested, and improved in a controlled environment before full implementation. This regulatory experimentation reduces the risk of unintended consequences, enhances transparency, and accelerates the adoption of beneficial policies. Regulatory sandboxes in space can offer multiple benefits (Parenti, 2020; Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft und Energie, 2025).
A Future for Safe and Sustainable Orbits: Summary
Space is no longer the exclusive preserve of a few pioneering nations or the symbolic arena of prestige projects. It has become a foundational infrastructure for the 21st century—enabling everything from global communications and navigation to environmental monitoring and financial systems. The growing reliance on orbital services makes space not just strategic but indispensable. However, as activity intensifies, the orbital domain has become increasingly congested, contested, and fragile.
Successful governance models from aviation and maritime sectors may offer useful guidance. Federated systems—anchored in certifiable behaviours, decentralised enforcement, and adaptive regulation—can create robust, global coordination without sacrificing sovereignty and without sacrificing the development of a vibrant commercial ecosystem.
Functional SDA nodes, interoperable technical protocols, and machine-readable behavioural norms would allow operators and regulators to coordinate effectively, even in a decentralised landscape. Commercial providers would supply satellite operators with necessary services and national authorities would retain enforcement powers. Enforcement and compliance could also be supported through market mechanisms such as insurance premiums and licensing conditions.
In this federated system, the public sector retains a vital, enabling role—not by duplicating market offerings, but by anchoring the ecosystem with trusted data, certification, and oversight. By focusing on core infrastructure and the validation of machine-readable behavioural norms, institutions like EUSST can empower a competitive commercial layer to flourish atop a reliable public foundation. This division of responsibilities not only avoids market distortion but actively cultivates a robust European SDA and STM sector—positioning Europe as a global leader in space safety, innovation, and regulatory foresight.
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